Beyond October 7

Kenneth Kgwadi. Pic: Supplied

OPINION: Kenneth Kgwadi is a Research Fellow at the Middle East Africa Research Institute (MEARI). He obtained his MA in African Studies from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (BGU).

Three years after the October 7 attacks, the search for peace in the Middle East remains as difficult and urgent as ever.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups launched a large-scale attack on Israel, killing more than 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals and abducting 251 people who were taken into the Gaza Strip as hostages. The attack shocked Israel and the wider world.

For Israelis, the immediate priority was understandably the return of those taken hostage. There was also a demand for accountability for the security failures that allowed the attack.

The Israeli government responded with a large-scale military campaign in Gaza, saying its objective was to dismantle Hamas and prevent another attack. From the Israeli perspective, the argument was that removing Hamas’s military capability would create a safer environment for Israelis while also creating conditions in which Palestinians could eventually live with greater security and stability.

That position, however, has existed alongside an enormous humanitarian toll in Gaza. The war has caused widespread destruction, displacement and a very high number of Palestinian deaths.

These consequences cannot be separated from any serious discussion about the region’s future. The United Nations has repeatedly called for an end to the suffering of both Israelis and Palestinians and for a political path towards lasting peace.

For me, October 7 was not simply an international news story. It happened a day before I was due to board a flight from Johannesburg to Tel Aviv to begin my postgraduate studies at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (BGU).

The trip was eventually delayed until December 2023.

I seriously considered abandoning what had been a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. But education has always been important to me. I also felt that, as a journalist and researcher, I needed to witness and understand what was happening rather than observe it only from a distance.

When I eventually arrived in Israel, the atmosphere was unlike anything I had previously experienced.

The streets were quieter. There were fewer people around. In some respects, it reminded me of the lockdown period in South Africa during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Posters of people who had been abducted were visible in public places. Messages of hope were everywhere.

The tragedy also touched the university community in which I found myself. BGU has said that eight members of its community were kidnapped and taken to Gaza.

Noa Argamani, a BGU student, became one of the most recognisable faces among those abducted on October 7. She was rescued on 8 June 2024, together with three other hostages, during an Israeli operation in the Nuseirat area of Gaza. BGU described her return as a moment of immense joy and relief for the university community.

Her rescue brought hope to families who were still waiting for their loved ones to return.

Living through those months changed the way I viewed the conflict.

I was born a few months after the release of Nelson Mandela. I grew up in a democratic South Africa and had never experienced war or large-scale political violence in my own surroundings.

Suddenly, I found myself living in a country at war.

I was frightened. Everyone was.

But this was a war zone, and there was little I could do except remain alert, follow the instructions of the authorities and continue with my studies and work.

By April 2024, the conflict had also moved into a more dangerous phase beyond Gaza.

On the night of 13 April and into 14 April, Iran launched a direct attack on Israel involving drones and missiles. It was a significant escalation because Iran had previously relied heavily on regional partners and proxies in its confrontation with Israel. The direct exchange between the two countries demonstrated how quickly the Gaza war could contribute to a wider regional confrontation.

For me, the confrontation was frightening precisely because of the uncertainty surrounding where it could lead.

There was fear in Israel, but the consequences were not confined to Israel. The possibility of a broader regional confrontation raised questions about what would happen to ordinary people across the Middle East.

The events following October 7 also contributed to a major shift in the regional balance of power.

Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria fell on 8 December 2024 after a rapid offensive by opposition forces. The collapse came after more than a decade of civil war and was influenced by several factors, including the weakening of Assad’s allies and the changing regional balance following the conflicts involving Israel, Hezbollah and Iran. It would therefore be too simplistic to describe Assad’s fall as being caused by October 7 alone.

The weakening of Iran’s regional position was nevertheless significant. Hezbollah, Iran’s long-standing ally in Lebanon, had become involved in the conflict with Israel after October 7, while Iran itself and Israel moved into confrontation.

The wider consequences made the Middle East even more unpredictable.

The history of the Israel-Palestine conflict stretches far beyond October 7.

Israel was established in 1948 following the end of the British Mandate for Palestine. On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, which recommended the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, with Jerusalem placed under a proposed international regime. The British Mandate ended in May 1948, and the Jewish Agency proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel on 14 May.

Since then, Israel has faced wars and prolonged hostility with neighbouring states and armed groups.

There have also been examples of countries moving in the opposite direction.

Egypt and Jordan established diplomatic relations with Israel, while the Abraham Accords opened formal relations between Israel and several Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.

These developments demonstrate that long-standing regional hostility is not necessarily permanent.

Iran remains a different and considerably more difficult case.

For years, Iran has supported armed groups in the region, including Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis, while Israel and Iran have increasingly confronted each other directly.

This creates a difficult environment for anyone searching for a political settlement.

My own view is that lasting peace will remain extremely difficult while Hamas retains the capacity to launch attacks against Israel.

A two-state solution cannot be achieved through repeated attacks against civilians or by firing missiles across a border. Such actions deepen fear and mistrust and make it harder for Israelis to believe that a future Palestinian state would coexist peacefully alongside Israel.

But the same principle must apply to all sides.

Security for Israelis cannot come at the expense of Palestinian civilians living without safety, dignity or a viable political future. Palestinians, too, deserve peace, stability and the opportunity to build lives free from perpetual conflict.

That is why the search for peace requires more than defeating an armed group.

It requires confronting the political questions that have remained unresolved for generations.

The events of October 7 changed the Middle East. They exposed profound security failures, triggered a devastating war and intensified tensions between regional powers.

Three years later, the challenge is not simply to remember what happened.

It is to find a way beyond it.

Peace will require difficult compromises, credible security guarantees and political leadership prepared to look beyond the next military confrontation.

For Israelis and Palestinians alike, the alternative is to remain trapped in a cycle in which each new generation inherits the fears and grievances of the previous one.

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